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The Impact of Asset-based versus Market Capitalization-based Shari’ah 
Screening on US and Japanese Equities: An Empirical Analysis 
Shehab Marzban * and Mehmet Asutay **
Abstract
This paper focuses on Shari’ah-compliant investments, which are managed in a 
Shari’ah-compliant manner that goes beyond defi ning a set of rules or guidelines to 
generate a static list of automatically screened equities.  Shari’ah screening is about 
identifying a set of investments that adhere to Shari’ah principles and would thus be 
considered eligible for an Islamic investor to invest in.  Generally, different Shari’ah 
mandates can be found across the industry that may result in different asset universe 
sizes and constituents.  The main distinction between the different rulebooks is the use 
of either total assets or market capitalization as the base to value a company and to use 
as denominator for the different fi nancial ratios.  By using the top 200 large cap com-
panies in the United States as well as Japan, this paper reveals that different Shari’ah 
mandates result in discrepancies in asset universe size, constituents, asset allocation and 
most important, return and risk.  Therefore such an analysis of the Shari’ah mandates 
is crucial before launching a new Islamic fund to ensure that the advantages and 
disadvantages of the different mandates are recognized and taken into consideration.  
This analysis also revealed that different mandates might be advantageous in different 
regions and time spans.
Introduction
Islamic fi nance has evolved in recent years into a term characterized by growth, opportunity and 
large discrepancy in terms of defi nition.  Islam and fi nance are terms that might on fi rst sight 
not make much sense if combined together.  Islam, which is a life style for its followers, is not 
only about defi ning faith, having ethical responsibilities and following specifi c religious rituals 
(called ibadat); it goes beyond that through defi ning mutual interactions and transactions (called 
muamalat) including fi nancial transactions.  Thus, Islamic fi nance is about conducting fi nancial 
transactions that adhere to Islamic principles or are considered Shari’ah-compliant.
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One such type of fi nancial activities is equity investments that by their nature are classed as 
Shari’ah-compliant assets due to their profi t-loss (musharakah) characteristics.
Since Shari’ah can be characterized by being highly diversifi ed, in this paper the main 
distinguishing Shari’ah requirements for identifying compliant investments are reviewed and 
discussed in depth.  This paper also aims to provide a critical approach to Shari’ah screening by 
suggesting other issues to be considered as part of moral screening.
It should be noted that Islamic fi nance is also about generating returns, and so the different 
Shari’ah requirements are analyzed with respect to risk and return and compared to each other to 
explore whether adhering to religious principles will impact investment returns and undertaken 
risks or not.  This analysis was empirically conducted from January to December 2010, using the 
top 200 large cap companies in the United States as well as Japan to explore the effect of using 
different Shari’ah methodologies on different asset universes.
1. Principles of Islamic Finance
Islamic fi nance is an alternative fi nancing method, which offers various instruments to conduct 
the fi nancing of economic activities from basic instruments to rather sophisticated methods. 
Regardless of the nature of the instruments used, Islamic fi nancial instruments are all subject to 
certain principles, which constitute the contents of the Shari’ah screening.  The main principle often 
referred to, and through which Islamic fi nance is known is the prohibition of interest or riba.  The 
other principles, which shape the nature of Islamic fi nance contracts, hence, are [Asutay 2010]:
 (i)  Prohibition of interest or riba, as an explicit Qur’anic injunction with the objective of 
providing not only a stable economy and fi nancial environment but also a socially effi cient 
economic environment;
 (ii)  As a consequence of the prohibition of interest, fi xed return is also prohibited as provided 
by interest [Ayub 2007];
 (iii)  Islamic finance aims at creating productive economic activity through asset-based 
fi nancing rather than a debt-based system, as the asset-backed principle requires that all 
fi nancial activities must be linked to tangible assets [Iqbal and Mirakhor 2006];
 (iv)  In Islamic fi nance, as a principle money does not have any inherent value in itself; and 
therefore money cannot be created through the credit system [Chapra 1985];
 (v)  Due to prohibiting interest, Islamic fi nance changes the nature of the relationship between 
capital and work by instituting the profi t and loss sharing (PLS) principle as a framework 
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within which economic and business activity takes place [Ayub 2007]; This aims at 
establishing justice between work effort and return, and between work effort and capital. 
As a consequence, risk sharing becomes another important feature of Islamic fi nance 
[Siddiqi 1985];
 (vi)  Profi t-and-loss sharing as well as the risk-sharing principle result in participatory nature 
economic and business activity through participatory fi nancing.  Through profi t-and-loss 
sharing, the providers of capital and labour merge to establish partnerships through their 
individual contributions in different ways within various Islamic fi nance instruments.
 (vii)  Productive economic and business activity together with the prohibition of interest, 
defi nes another principle of Islamic fi nance and also another rule for Shari’ah screening: 
uncertainty (gharar), speculation and gambling is also prohibited with the objective of 
developing a stable fi nancial system which continues to link fi nance with the real economy 
through asset-based productive economic activity [Iqbal and Mirakhor 2006].
 (viii)  Business activity is also limited, as certain sectors are not considered as ‘halal’ or 
lawful, which includes any business activity causing harm to individuals, society and 
the environment, such as environmentally harmful business activity, the arms industry, 
pornography, pork production and related sectors etc.
It should be noted that despite all these principles, through present legal (fi qhi) scholarship 
new and more sophisticated fi nancial instruments are developed within the understanding 
of acceptable levels of uncertainty in responding to the current needs of the industry.  Such 
compromises have also been observed in shifting from asset-based fi nancing to debt-based 
fi nancing and from profi t-and-loss sharing paradigms such as musharakah and mudarabah to 
mark-up based debt oriented instruments such as murabahah.
These fi nancial rules in Islam are articulated in the Qur’anic verse that “trade is allowed, 
riba (interest) is prohibited.”  Accordingly, profi t constitutes the essential return for business 
activity, and it is around this point that Islamic fi nancial instruments are shaped [Asutay 2010].
Asutay [2010] summarises the comparison between interest and profi t to develop a better 
understanding of the differences between the two, as depicted in Table 1.
In summarizing all these, as Figure 1 depicts, Islamic fi nance is the outcome of religious 
ethics in banking due to the fact that, Islamic banking and fi nance solutions are engineered with 
the Shari’ah fi lter process which is informed through Shari’ah sources producing Islamic fi nance 
contracts or fi qh al-muamalat contracts within and according to the principles identifi ed (lower 
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section of Figure 1).
Thus this study aims to apply Shari’ah screening to US and Japanese equities whereby 
the impact of asset-based versus market capitalization-based Shari’ah screening is established 
empirically through asset management.
2. Shari’ah-compliant Asset Management
Investing according to the Shari’ah is not a straightforward exercise since it is highly complex 
and needs to be handled with great precaution to ensure that the Shari’ah requirements are 
Table 1.  Comparing Interest and Profi t
Interest Profi t
Return on a capital Return on a project
The interest is guaranteed The risk of loss is involved
Fixed return Variable return
Return on deposit Return on joint ventures and participated and fi nanced projects
Source: Prepared by the Authors.
Fig. 1.  Shari’ah Screening Process
Source: [Khan 2007]
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met as intended by the Shari’ah governing body (the Shari’ah board).  Due to the complexity 
of modern capital markets, the existence of complex investment instruments and the 
multidisciplinary and global involvement of companies, Shari’ah scholars are required to use 
deductive and analytical logic as well as religious interpretation (Ijtihad) to extract from the 
verbal and historical Shari’ah sources a set of rules or guidelines to be employed to determine 
which investments can be undertaken from a compliance perspective.
The responsibility of ensuring that conducted investments such as Shari’ah-compliant funds 
are managed in a Shari’ah-compliant manner goes beyond defi ning a set of rules or guidelines 
to generate a static list of automatically screened equities.  Shari’ah-compliance is actually 
about providing fund managers with credible Shari’ah advisory, data and screening services, 
purifi cation, and on-going compliance monitoring capabilities.
To ensure that the entire fund management process is run according to Shari’ah principles, 
conventional portfolio management processes need to be extended by multiple Shari’ah-specifi c 
requirements to ensure that funds are managed in accordance with the Shari’ah.  In the planning 
phase a Shari’ah governing body has to be selected to defi ne the set of rules / guidelines, in the 
form a set of rules or guidelines called a Shari’ah mandate to be followed, to determine which 
investments are to be considered eligible.  Once the Shari’ah governing body is appointed, 
mostly in the form of a Shari’ah board or advisory provider, a data and screening provider has 
to be selected to screen assets to determine which investments adhere to the guidelines defi ned 
and would represent a permissible investment universe.  Across the industry most funds would 
either outsource the Shari’ah governance and screening to an index provider or hire an internal 
Shari’ah board and separate screening provider.
Other Shari’ah-specifi c considerations include the quantifi cation of purifi cation, which is 
the process of purifying or cleansing any non-compliant elements from conducted investments, 
report generation to capture Shari’ah monitoring requirements refl ecting compliance changes 
over time, as well as portfolio purifi cation calculations.
2.1 Shari’ah Screening / Guidelines
Shari’ah screening is about identifying a set of investments that adhere to Shari’ah principles and 
would thus be considered eligible for an Islamic investor to invest in.
Such screening is fi rst to be applied on an asset class level and afterwards on a security 
level.  On an asset class level interest-based or speculative instruments are not compliant with 
the Shari’ah.  Therefore the Shari’ah forbids investment in conventional interest-bearing bonds, 
derivative and speculative instruments and activities such as futures, forwards, options, short-
Asian and African Area Studies, 11 (2)
156
selling transactions as well as preferred shares that provide a fi xed or guaranteed dividend 
payment.  Once these asset classes are screened out, the remaining instruments (mainly equities) 
are analyzed in depth through applying fi rst a set of sector-specifi c guidelines / ratios to identify 
the level of income from non-compliant activities and secondly a set of fi nancial ratios measuring 
the involvement in interest-based investment and borrowing transactions.
The sector-based screening process would investigate whether companies are involved in 
Shari’ah non-compliant activities—such as the sale of pork or alcohol—and fi nancial activities. 
This enables the exclusion of businesses whose primary activity does not comply with the 
Shari’ah, such as conventional banks, bars and casinos.  Financial screens, on the other hand, 
measure businesses’ involvement in Shari’ah non-compliant activities, such as interest earnings 
and debt fi nancing.
Generally, different Shari’ah mandates can be found across the industry, which may result 
in different asset universe sizes and constituents.  The main distinction between the different 
rulebooks is the use of either total assets or market capitalization as the base to value a company 
and to use as the denominator for the different fi nancial ratios.
Formally, fi nancial screens are in the form of ratios that are compared to a maximum 
allowable threshold level.  Those ratios focus on different aspects of an investment like liquidity, 
interest, debt and non-permissible income.  Each Shari’ah board uses a bundle of ratios for 
screening the potential investments and an investment is compliant if and only if it passes all 
screens included in the bundle.
The following are two typical Shari’ah mandates / bundles used across the industry.  The 
distinguishing factor between them is the divisor.
Other versions of the above-stated rulebooks can be found across the industry such as ones 
using a combined cash and receivables ratio or including non-operating interest as part of non-
Table 2.  Rulebooks
Asset-based Rulebook Market Cap-based Rulebook
Non-permissible Income / Total Income 
<5%
Non-permissible Income / Total Income <5%
Interest-bearing Cash and Investments / 
Assets <33%
Interest-bearing Cash and Investments / 12 month average 
market capitalization <33%
Receivables / Assets <33% Receivables / 12 month average market capitalization <33%
Interest-bearing Debt / Assets <33% Interest-bearing Debt / 12 month average market 
capitalization <33%
Source: Prepared by the Authors.
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permissible income.1）
Derigs and Marzban [2008] were the fi rst to survey all the Shari’ah mandates in depth 
and to investigate the impact of using different Shari’ah mandates on asset universe size and 
constituents using the main Shari’ah mandates (S&P, Dow Jones, MSCI, FTSE and HSBC) 
used across the industry.  Afterwards, Derigs and Marzban [2009] investigated the impact of 
the different Shari’ah mandates on portfolio performance using a Mean-Variance Optimization 
model.  The results revealed that market capitalization-based Shari’ah mandates such as Dow 
Jones and S&P outperform asset-based rulebooks such as the ones used by MSCI, FTSE 
and HSBC.  Marzban and Asutay [2009] analyzed the impact of Shari’ah mandates on the 
performance of GCC stocks and proved that asset-based rulebooks outperform their market 
cap-based counterparts due to the relatively high book value of industrial and petrochemical 
companies compared to their market capitalization in the GCC.  Marzban and Donia [2010] 
applied a market-cap weighted asset allocation model for US companies and the results revealed 
that market cap-based rulebooks result in much higher returns compared to asset-based 
rulebooks in the US.
3. Empirical Analysis of the Shari’ah Mandates
Since scholars differ in opinion on using either total assets or market capitalization as the divisor, 
it is important to analyze the impact of using the two rulebook variants on the asset universe size 
and the expected performance, as well as the anticipated risk level.
Within this research, this analysis is conducted on two different asset universes.  The fi rst 
asset universe contains the top 200 large cap companies in the United States, whereas the second 
universe contains the top 200 large cap companies in Japan.
3.1  US Large-Cap Universe
Through considering the 200 large-cap companies in the US it can be noted that the number of 
compliant companies using an asset-based or market-cap based rulebook is almost identical, 
with about 45% of the asset universe being Shari’ah-compliant.  Notable from Table 3 is that 
the market cap-based mandate results in a larger exposure to the technology sector but zero 
exposure to the utilities sector.  This phenomenon has been discussed by Marzban [2009] where 
he proved that the technology and health sector is more appropriately screened using market 
cap-based mandates whereas it is preferable to screen utility and industrial companies using total 
 1） A detailed survey of Shari’ah screens can be found in [Derigs and Marzban 2008].
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assets.
Critical from a Shari’ah perspective are the results in Table 4, which indicate that even if 
the previous results showed that the asset universe size using different screening methodologies 
is almost identical, the constituents of the universe differ widely.  In the case of the US Large-
cap companies analyzed, a 21.5% discrepancy exists between the two Shari’ah mandates, which 
means that about one out of fi ve companies would be compliant using one mandate and non-
compliant using the other.
So, if a fund manager is keen to invest in specifi c sectors such as the technology sector this 
would mean that he or she is better off using a market-cap based Shari’ah mandate.
Finally, the compliant universes are analyzed from a return and risk perspective.  Portfolios 
are constructed from the respective asset universe by weighting the investments by their relative 
market capitalization on the 1st of January 2010.
The constructed portfolios are evaluated by their Year-To-Date (YTD) weighted portfolio 
return and weighted Beta as can be seen in Table 5.  As can be noted the conventional portfolios 
Table 3.  US Compliant Asset Universe
Sector Total Assets Market Cap
Basic Materials  11  10   8
Cyclical Consumer Goods / Services  30  10  12
Energy  20  16  13
Financials  35   0   0
Healthcare  22  17  21
Industrials  28  12   9
Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods / Services  17   7   9
Technology  25  12  21
Telecommunications Services   3   2   1
Utilities   9   5   0
Grand Total 200  91  94
Source: Prepared by the Authors.
Table 4.  US Compliance Discrepancies
Total Assets
FAIL PASS Grand Total
Market Cap FAIL    43%    10%  53%
PASS 11.50% 35.50%  47%
Grand Total 54.50% 45.50% 100%
Source: Prepared by the Authors.
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without Shari’ah restrictions achieved the highest YTD performance which came with the highest 
risk almost identical to market risk.
The superiority of the conventional portfolios’ performance when compared to the Shari’ah-
based portfolios is mainly attributable to the recovering fi nancial sector, which is not part of the 
Shari’ah-compliant asset universe.
It is interesting that the asset-based universe dominates the market cap-based universe 
both in terms of return and risk.  This behavior is attributable to the utility and basic materials 
companies that are compliant using the asset-based rulebook and are non-compliant using 
market-capitalization.  These companies actually achieved high return levels and therefore 
superior performance.
It is worth mentioning here that in a previous research conducted by Marzban and Donia 
[2010] on the same asset universe but for the entire year of 2008, the opposite results have been 
achieved (see Table 6).
In this previous research the market cap-based mandate outperforms the asset-based 
mandates by 8%.  This can be explained by the fact that this analysis was based on a pre-crisis 
status where market capitalizations were relatively high compared to 2010 numbers.  These 
equities have still not totally recovered from the crisis and are thus still non-compliant using 
market cap-based mandates.
3.2  Japanese Large-Cap Universe
Conducting the same analysis on the large-cap companies in Japan, it can be noted that the 
asset-based Shari’ah mandate has a much larger asset universe (capturing an additional 17% of 
the total asset universe) compared to the market cap-based universe.  This difference is mainly 
attributable to the cyclical consumer goods and industrial companies which have a signifi cant 
larger asset value compared to market capitalization.
In Table 8, the discrepancy between the two methodologies is much higher for the Japanese 
universe (29%) than the US universe (21.50%).  So from an asset universe size the results would 
prioritize an asset-based Shari’ah mandate in Japan which is also a different result from the one 
Table 5.  US Return / Risk Analysis
Universe YTD Beta
Conventional   9.08%   0.9947
Asset-based   7.81%   0.8160
Market Cap-based   6.48%   0.8588
Source: Prepared by the Authors.
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concluded based on the US universe.
Finally, even from a risk and return perspective the Japanese universe results in different 
conclusions from the US universe.  Even though the market cap-based mandate results in a much 
smaller universe, the quality of the stocks is superior to the ones determined using the asset-based 
rulebook, resulting in achieving almost fi ve times the return at a lower risk compared to the 
market.  The main reason that the market cap-based mandate outperformed the total asset-based 
one is that a large number of weakly performing companies (such as Sharp or Toshiba) are non-
Table 6.  US Weights and Performance of Market Cap versus Total Assets Mandates
Divisors Market Capitalization Total Assets
Weight Weighted Return Weight Weighted Return
Sectors
Basic Materials   4.23%   4.28%   4.75%   4.86%
Consumer Goods  14.01%   2.95%  15.08%   3.05%
Consumer Services   7.53%   2.68%   7.03%   3.04%
Financials   0.61%   0.17%   0.34%   0.07%
Health Care  20.37%   4.15%  17.51%   3.05%
Industrials   4.66%   1.80%   7.80%   3.45%
Oil & Gas  17.63%   3.28%  23.50%   4.72%
Technology  30.96%  19.65%  14.75%   8.39%
Telecommunications   6.01%   0.15%
Utilities   3.22%   0.28%
Total Return Jan 08 to Jan 09 100.00%  38.95% 100.00%  31.07%
Number of Compliant Equities 89 94
Source: Prepared by the Authors.
Table 7.  Japan Compliant Asset Universe
Sector Total Assets Market Cap
Basic Materials  16   9   6
Cyclical Consumer Goods / Services  39  19   6
Energy   3   0   0
Financials  28   1   0
Healthcare  13  11  11
Industrials  54  26  14
Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods / Services  12   6   6
Technology  19  12  10
Telecommunications Services   4   3   1
Utilities  12   1   0
Grand Total 200  88  54
Source: Prepared by the Authors.
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compliant under the market cap-based mandate.
3.3  Harmonizing the Mandates—Ijmaa Strategy
Based on an a strategy developed by Marzban [2009], a consensus or Ijmaa universe is to be used 
as the Shari’ah-compliant universe which is determined through selecting only the companies 
which are compliant across all the Shari’ah mandates considered.
This approach of course would result in a smaller asset universe but based on the results in 
Table 10, for the US universe the Ijmaa strategy achieves superior return and risk fi gures when 
compared to each Shari’ah mandate individually and for the Japan universe the Ijmaa strategy 
achieves the lowest risk but from a performance perspective is outperformed by the market cap-
based mandate.
Table 8.  Japan Compliance Discrepancies
Total Assets
FAIL PASS Grand Total
Market Cap FAIL  50%  23% 146
PASS   6%  21%  54
Grand Total 112  88 200
Source: Prepared by the Authors.
Table 9.  Japan Return / Risk Analysis
Universe YTD Beta
Conventional 2.47% 0.9803
Asset-based 0.23% 0.9705
Market Cap-based 1.06% 0.8790
Source: Prepared by the Authors.
Table 10.  Ijmaa Strategy versus Individual Mandates
Universe YTD Beta
US Universe
Asset-based 7.81% 0.8160
Market Cap-based 6.48% 0.8588
Ijmaa 8.03% 0.8012
Japan Universe
Asset-based 0.23% 0.9705
Market Cap-based 1.06% 0.8790
Ijmaa 0.25% 0.8611
Source: Prepared by the Authors.
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4. Critical Perspectives on the Shari’ah Screening Process
The analysis in this paper has so far utilized the conventional Shari’ah screening adopted in the 
Islamic fi nance industry.  This is, however, based on the idea of ‘form’ or the Shari’ah compliancy 
in terms of legal requirements.  In other words, in Shari’ah screening the above mentioned 
principles as Islamic rules are considered, which has been the common practice.  However, 
considering that Islamic fi nance is also the articulation of Islamic ethics and morals in banking as 
it is located within Islamic moral economy [Asutay 2007a, 2007b], it is essential to endogenise 
the aspirations of Islamic moral economy in the Shari’ah screening process so that the observed 
social failure of Islamic banking can be overcome [Asutay 2007b, 2008].
In understanding the moral aspects of Shari’ah screening as identifi ed by the ethical norms 
of Islamic moral economy, alongside the above mentioned principles, further principles of Islamic 
fi nance have to be identifi ed, as follows [Khan 2007]:
 (i)  Community banking aiming at serving communities not markets;
 (ii)  Responsible fi nance, as it builds systematic checks on fi nancial providers; and restrains 
consumer indebtedness; ethical investment, and CSR initiatives;
 (iii)  An alternative paradigm that offers stability by linking fi nancial services to the productive, 
real economy while providing a moral compass for capitalism; and
 (iv)  Fulfi ls aspirations in the sense that it widens the ownership base of society, and offers 
‘success with authenticity.’
These additional principles help to endogenise ethics into the Shari’ah screening process, 
thus ensuring the ethical outcomes expected by Islamic moral economy.  In other words, the 
operations, activities, returns, and revenues of Islamic banking and fi nance institutions as well 
as corporations should be screened with such a comprehensive process in order to yield a moral 
outcome.  This will also respond to the shortcomings in ‘Shari’ah compliancy’ by ensuring 
‘Shari’ah based’ results by implying that in addition to ‘form’ the ‘substance’ is also served.  For 
example, ‘form’ oriented Shari’ah screening does not consider CSR initiatives and environmental 
issues in evaluating the performance of banks, fi nancial institutions and corporations.  However, 
the framework of the comprehensive Shari’ah screening process suggested in this section aims 
to make sure that a Shari’ah screening consequentialist approach should be adopted through 
which the social and environmental consequences of the fi nancing activities of Islamic banks and 
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fi nancial institutions should also be taken into account.  These comprehensive Shari’ah screening 
rules as an extension of the Shari’ah screening rules identifi ed in Figure 1 are depicted in Figure 2:
As can be seen in Figure 2, in the comprehensive screening process, the Shari’ah fi ltering 
process includes a ‘moral screening process’ as well, which can be seen in the top right-hand 
box (dashed line box).  This Shari’ah screening process is expected to deliver solutions, which 
also serves the moral objectives as stated above, as a consequence, which are identifi ed in the 
bottom right-hand box (dashed line box).  Thus, through endogenising morals into the Shari’ah 
screening process, it is possible to achieve Shari’ah based results which maximise the social 
outcome whereby not only the ‘form’ but also the ‘substance’ of Islamic fi nance is ensured.
An example of the distinction between the processes identified in Figure 1 (Shari’ah 
compliancy or form oriented screening) and Figure 2 (Shari’ah based or substance oriented 
screening) can be illustrated by the case of Zamzam Towers, which is a large block of up-market, 
luxurious apartments overlooking the Kabah in Makkah offered through a time-sharing concept. 
The construction of the tower was possible through Islamic fi nance.  Because the Shari’ah 
Fig. 2.  Comprehensive Shari’ah Screening Process
Source: Asutay [2011] is an extended version of Khan [2007].
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screening they employed was based on a ‘form’ oriented understanding as explained in Figure 1, 
the Shari’ah scholars who approved the project did not fi nd any problem in approving it, while 
it clearly undermines the spirituality of Islam’s most holy place, undermines equal opportunities 
in worshipping, damages the historicity of the place, and harms the environment.  However, if 
it had been judged according to the moral screening process based on ‘substance’ in addition to 
‘form’; Zamzam Towers would not have been found acceptable as an Islamic fi nance project. 
Thus, the consequentialist approach produces a moral outcome in the screening process, which is 
what Islamic fi nance aims to achieve in an aspirational sense, as Islamic fi nance is the outcome of 
religious ethics in banking and fi nance.
In summary, there is a need for a paradigm shift in Islamic fi nance not only in terms of the 
Shari’ah screening of investments and the credit policies of Islamic banking and fi nance, but also 
in the Shari’ah screening of these institutions by rating agencies.  The comprehensive screening 
process proposed in this study should be considered as part of the mentioned paradigm shift 
towards comprehensive ‘Shari’ah based fi nance’ as opposed to narrow and form based ‘Shari’ah 
compliant fi nancing.’
Conclusion
The analysis in this study reveals that different Shari’ah mandates result in discrepancies in asset 
universe size, constituents, asset allocation and most importantly return and risk.  Therefore 
an analysis of the Shari’ah mandates is crucial before launching a new Islamic fund to ensure 
that the advantages and disadvantages of the different mandates are recognized and taken into 
consideration.
The analysis also revealed that different mandates might be advantageous in different 
regions and time spans.  For instance the ‘asset-based mandate’ resulted in a much larger asset 
universe in Japan while ‘market capitalization’ resulted in a larger universe in the US.  Based 
on previous research, pre-crisis market capitalization resulted in better portfolio performance, 
whereas during circumstances when the markets had not yet recovered from the crisis, asset-
based mandates were superior.
Finally, better results and harmonization might be achievable through using the Ijmaa 
strategy [Derigs and Marzban 2009] that resulted in promising results in terms of risk and/or 
return for both the US and Japan markets.
Lastly, this paper suggests that the Shari’ah screening process, not only at the institutional 
level but also in its overall evaluation, should follow a comprehensive screening process by 
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endogenising ethical and social factors whereby the aspirations of Islamic moral economy can be 
fulfi lled and the narrow ‘form’ oriented screening process can be substantiated by a ‘substance’ 
oriented process.  The outcome of the evaluation of the Shari’ah assets of Islamic fi nance 
institutions will then be different.  Such a paradigm shift would be a really positive step in the 
right direction for the development of the industry.
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